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Abstract 
 
Safety surveys normally focus on the influence of formal safety management (bureaucracy) 
on safety performances, while neglecting the impact of informal coping strategies (craftsman-
ship) that are the main topic of ethnographic safety studies. Based on a survey in a Dutch en-
ergy company (N=265) we show this negligence is problematic. First, the effect of formal 
safety management on self-reported incidents and accidents depends on informal coping 
strategies. It is shown that informal coping strategies facilitate formal safety management. 
Second, informal coping strategies influence safety performances independent of formal 
safety management. The perceived utilisation of tacit knowledge improves safety records (i.e. 
self-reported incidents and accidents) because it reduces unsafe behaviour, while perceived 
presence of professional discretion worsens it because it enhances unsafe behaviour. Our find-
ings show that the findings of ethnographic safety studies can be incorporated fruitfully in 
safety surveys. 
 
 
 
 
‘“I will have no man in my boat”, said Starbuck, “who is not afraid of a whale”. By 
this, he seemed to mean, not only that the most reliable and useful courage was that 
which arises from the fair estimation of the encountered peril, but that an utterly fear-
less man is a far more dangerous comrade than a coward’  
(Herman Melville, Moby Dick 1992 [1851]: 116). 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Two main research traditions can be identified in research regarding the causes and preven-
tion of work related incidents and accidents: socio-psychological survey research and ethno-
graphic studies. 
Safety surveys normally focus on the importance of formal safety management for 
safety performances. Safety management is conceived of as a bureaucratic system of regula-
tions which are enforced and trained. Often, the perceived presence of an elaborate safety pol-
icy is designated an important indicator of a healthy safety climate (see for example Cooper & 
Philips, 2004: 497; Mearns & Flin, 1999: 5). Researches probe into the positive effects of the 
perceived presence of bureaucratic safety management on self-reported incidents and acci-
dents. Most studies indeed find positive direct or indirect effects of one ore more dimensions 
of perceived bureaucratic safety management on self-reported unsafe behaviour, incidents and 
accidents (Varonen & Mattila, 2000; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2001; Cooper & Philips, 
2004). 
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Ethnographic safety studies, on the other hand, deal with processes not embedded in 
formal organisational structures that influence the exposure of individual employees to risks 
in specific sectors or occupations. This means their main focus is on the informal organisa-
tion: ‘the actual personal interrelations existing among the members of the organization which 
are not represented by, or are inadequately represented by, the formal organization’  
(Roethlisberger en Dickson, 1950 [1939]: 566).  
Survey research on the importance of safety climate dominates. It is less time consum-
ing than conducting ethnographic studies and sooner heralds the promise of revealing causes 
of accidents that can be tackled by concrete policy instruments.1 In this research tradition the 
search for advance is clearly present. Researchers often refer to similar previous surveys, use 
validated measurement instruments, replicate studies, and try to solve well known problems 
(for latter point, see Guldenmund 2000: 247 and Glendon & Litherland 2001: 162). However, 
the separation with the ethnographic research tradition is almost complete. If any reference is 
made at all, it is merely to point out such research exists (Hopkins, 2006: 878-890). We do not 
know of any research systematically incorporating the insights of ethnographic studies into a 
safety survey. 
This blind spot means there are no safety surveys probing the extent to which the ef-
fects of formal, bureaucratic safety management on safety performances depend on the infor-
mal handlings of safety. This is remarkable because several organisation studies have demon-
strated that the informal organisation can have great impact on the realisation of formal organ-
isational goals. Barnard (1962 [1938]) has shown that the informal organisation can comple-
ment the formal one in important respects. It can provide crucial communication channels and 
cohesion among individuals and groups and protect the integrity of individual organisation 
members. On the other hand, the informal organisation can also hamper the realisation of 
formal goals. Parties of which the interests are underrepresented in formal policy can frustrate 
or sabotage it by applying informal tactics (see for example, Gouldner, 1954; Watson, 1987: 
chapter 7; Morrill, Zald, & Below, 2003). First, these studies show the impact of the formal 
organisation on the realisation of organisational goals cannot be understood well without con-
sidering the informal organisation. Next, they make clear the effects of formal policy depend 
on the extent to which it is legitimized. The less formal policy is legitimized, the more it is 
undermined by the informal organisation. 
                                                 
1. This appeals to the business commissioners who often subsidise this kind of research. 
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Therefore, our first goal was to find out to what extent the effects of formal safety 
management depend on informal coping strategies with safety. In other words, we wanted to 
find out whether an eventual positive influence of formal safety management on safety per-
formances is enabled or hampered by informal coping strategies. Our next goal was to find 
out to what extent the effects of both formal and informal safety management depend on their 
legitimacy. Finally, we tried to establish to what extent the informal coping strategies have an 
influence on safety performances apart from formal safety management. Before we answer 
these research questions, we describe the main characteristics of informal coping strategies 
occurring in ethnographic safety studies. 
 
 
Ethnographic Safety Studies: Craftsmanship 
 
Can specific coping strategies with safety be derived from ethnographic safety studies, and if 
so, what do they look like? This has proven to be the case. Three dimensions can be distin-
guished: ‘discretion’, ‘tacit knowledge’, and ‘personal responsibility’. 
 
Discretion 
Several studies show employees de-emphasise the value of rules and procedures. They feel 
regulation does not foresee all risky situations and when it does, it does not necessarily mean 
regulation provides the best answer to handling risks. 
Brun (1995) showed that linemen sometimes refrain from using mandatory safety gog-
gles claiming they reduced visual contact with the electrified components. They also did not 
use protective devices aimed to shelter them from accidental contact with electricity because 
installing and removing them created added risks. By refraining from using protective equip-
ment, workers regained control over their working environment: ‘When we install protective 
equipment and do our work, we apply our own logic and knowledge… We have no control at 
all over the protective equipment, all we can do is hope it still works… But when it comes to 
my own powers, I know I’m still good for a while longer!’ (Brun, 1995: 819). Such practices 
were condemned by management, which accused employees of being reckless and incompe-
tent. 
Schepens (2005) draws similar conclusions in relation to lumberjacks of whom one in 
five had an accident every year. While the lumberjacks’ association condemned deviating 
from safety regulations, the lumberjacks stressed they did because the rules were counterpro-
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ductive. For example, safety regulations dictated the use of face shields. According to the 
lumberjacks, these shields limited their sight, making it unable for them to see what was hap-
pening in the trees. Moreover, the noise shield in the helmets limited the hearing ability so 
they did not notice branches braking off. Lumberjacks perceived the real danger was the di-
minishing of audiovisual contact with the environment instead of not wearing the mandatory 
personal protection devices. 
As these examples show, employees often disagree with those who do not have to 
work with the rules themselves (see also Mascini, 2005). Managers, branch organisations and 
monitoring governmental organisations condemn this behaviour of the users. However, if 
non-users refuse to acknowledge the impracticality of rules it can have severe consequences, 
as shown by Baccus’ study (1986) into the regulation of maintenance and repair of so-called 
‘Multipiece Truck Wheels’. As the Ministry of Transport insisted their work instructions were 
valid, tens of people were killed and hundreds injured during these work activities because in 
practice, it was impossible for the mechanics to follow these rules. The instructions were 
based on the assumption that garages were well equipped and spacious, while mechanics had 
to deal with lack of space and protective equipment and with a lot of work that had to be done 
outside the garages. It took a lot of external pressure on the Ministry of Transport before it 
decided to ban this type of truck wheels altogether. 
In short, a reoccurring theme in ethnographic studies is employees’ emphasis on the 
importance of what Freidson calls  (1999: 23) discretionary specialization. Discretionary spe-
cialization involves work of which ‘[…] the tasks and their outcome are believed to be so in-
determinate […] as to require attention to the variation to be found in individual cases. And 
while those whose occupation it is to perform such tasks will almost certainly engage in some 
routines that can be quite mechanical, it is believed that they must be prepared to be sensitive 
to the necessity of altering routine for individual circumstances that require discretionary 
judgement and action’. 
 
Tacit knowledge 
The relativising of the value of procedures by those for whom they are intended, is closely 
related to the limited usefulness they attribute to formal training. This is explicitly brought 
forward by previously mentioned research by Schepens on lumberjacks, by Brooks (2005) on 
fishermen and by Gherardi & Nicolini (2002) on builders. This particular type of manual 
worker is convinced novices do not learn the trade by formal training, but by acquiring ex-
perience. They argue formal training teaches novices mainly techniques without context, 
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based on ideal circumstances and applicable to every situation (Gherardi & Nicolini 2002: 
202). However, according to lumberjacks, for example, each tree is unique. In order to pre-
vent accidents it is necessary to acknowledge the fact that all knowledge is relative when 
commencing a new task (Schepens, 2005: 7). This means they conceive professionalism not 
as a fixed status, but as something to be proven constantly. 
Gherardi & Nicolini (2002) also stress that during the training of novices on a con-
struction site a lot more value is placed on the development of so-called ‘sensory maps’ than 
on safety training and education. By seeing, talking, listening, feeling and doing, novices 
learn to recognise dangers and how to deal with them. Therefore, learning to work safely is 
not so much a matter of acquiring cognitive knowledge, but rather a matter of gaining experi-
ence and involving all senses during this process. By developing ‘sensory maps’ novices 
gradually master the ‘tacit skills’, that constitute the ‘community of practices’ on an construc-
tion site (Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002: 196). During this learning process, the novice gradually 
transforms from an unknowing outsider to an expert co-worker through ‘legitimate peripheral 
participation’. ‘Developing a sense of safety [thus] relies on ineffable and not communicable 
subtleties mainly derived from the repeated exposure to clues and sensory experiences pro-
vided by the unfolding activity, as well as from the linguistic productions that take place dur-
ing the activity. Active participation as a legitimated member within the unfolding activity is 
therefore a necessary precondition for appropriating a culture of practice and for learning to 
take place (Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002: 217). 
The notion that novices’ training can only commence in practise is closely related to a 
master apprentice relationship. This entails an experienced master pointing novices at risks 
and demonstrating them how to deal with them. Brooks (2005: 808) describes such a relation-
ship in his study on fishermen, namely between skipper and deckhand: ‘Unsafe practices are 
corrected swiftly and, in the case of a new deckhand, none to gently’. Other studies also show 
novices are warned about mistakes and dangers harshly. For example, Gouldner (1954: 119) 
found that older, experienced miners: ‘enjoyed scaring “snowbirds” (as newcomers to the 
mine were called) […]’. Lumberjacks verbally abuse novices in combination with hitting 
them on their helmets, to make them aware of the risk surrounding their work environment 
(Schepens, 2005: 5). Masters also use accidents to make novices aware of their mistakes. 
They feel accidents are an effective means by which the consequences of not following ad-
vices can be illustrated, precisely because the victims find the consequences to their cost 
(Schepens, 2005: 6). 
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These stringent tactics are not only aimed at correcting or warning novices, but also at 
testing fellow workers’ stress tolerance. Brun (1995: 821) showed linemen deliberately took 
risks in order ‘to check on each other from time to time’. Haas (1977: 162) called this ‘bing-
ing’. He showed how high steel ironworkers tested their co-workers’ trustworthiness by con-
stantly baiting and belittling them, a treatment especially reserved for novices. Those who 
could not take binging were viewed as untrustworthy and consequently were made to quit. 
Gouldner (1954: 134) showed the harsh treatment of co-workers who could not handle bing-
ing was especially effective because of the dangerous circumstances in which they worked: 
‘Ostracism and isolation were a much more disturbing experience to the deviant in the dark-
ened mine than to a worker in the well lighted surface factory’. 
We can conclude that learning to work safely is closely related to what Polanyi called 
tacit knowledge. ‘This type of knowledge is unverbalized, perhaps even unverbalizable, but in 
any case not part of a formal corpus of codified technique. First, the acquisition of tacit 
knowledge is based on experience rather than formal theory. Such skills are learned not in 
classrooms, but rather during the course of working […]. It is neither formal in character nor 
systematically articulated (Polanyi 1967)’ (Freidson 1999: 25/6). Secondly, the master ap-
prentice relationship plays an important role regarding tacit knowledge: ‘Recruits to crafts 
[…] learn their craft as they work on the job with a full-fledged member of the trade who 
serves as teacher and supervisor. The craft is learned as a practical, vocational enterprise in 
which the working knowledge and tacit skills required are learned as work is being per-
formed’ (Freidson 1999: 89). Thirdly, ‘binging’ ensures novices store this tacit knowledge 
into their system and those who cannot deal with it face ostracism. 
 
Personal responsibility 
Closely related to the socialisation of novices and the process of learning to recognise and 
deal with dangers is the attribution of responsibility for accidents. Several studies show em-
ployees tend to place responsibility for accidents on those who had them (‘blaming the vic-
tim’) (Schepens, 2005). For instance, this proved to be an important reason why employees of 
a steel factory never actually sued their employers for damages on account of work related 
injuries (Fischer, 1993). Employees tend to cover up incidents and accidents fearing they 
might damage their status as a professional. Employees, as it happens, assume accidents can-
not happen when employees are vigilant. They attribute accidents to moments of distraction 
and amateurism: ‘An accident thus becomes an individual shortcoming, something of which 
to be ashamed. It is an index of weakness’ (Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002: 204). There are cir-
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cumstances, though, were those involved realise they are exposed to uncontrollable forces. 
Mines can collapse suddenly, sawed off trees can get caught in other trees and move unpre-
dictably, and sudden changes in the weather at open see can cause mayhem. 
Employees use at least two strategies to cope with such uncontrollable circumstances. 
First, they attribute human characteristics to nature. Miners talk about a ‘talking roof’; ‘As we 
say it, “The roof is talking to you!”’ (Gouldner, 1954: 118). Lumberjacks compare woods to 
humans: ‘Un bout de bois, c’est comme un être humain, il n’y en a pas un qui se ressemble, 
de caractère, de forme, de corpulence. Un bout de bois..., c’est pareil, ils ont tous leur petite 
malice. Il y en a qui sont très gentils, il y en a qui sont malins, il y en a qui sont très malins’ 
(Schepens, 2005: 12) and a retired fisherman said ‘The sea can be mean’ (Brooks, 2005: 806). 
Although those involved use these animistic views to indicate nature decides over life and 
death, that does not mean they feel at the mercy of nature. On the contrary, a skilled observer 
knows the characteristics of the natural environment and how to handle them. The profes-
sional skipper knows he always has to pay respect to the sea (Brooks, 2005: 806), the experi-
enced lumberjack feels a malicious tree branch will strike during the smallest lapse of concen-
tration and an able mine worker hears the roof talking when little stones suddenly begin to fall 
(Gouldner, 1954: 118). This means the sea, the mine and the woods judge whether you are an 
expert or an amateur; who has an accident was unable to interpret the signals by the natural 
environment and thus proves to be an amateur. Therefore, employees do not attribute acci-
dents to coincidence or bad luck, but to personal mistakes (Schepens, 2005: 13). 
This feeling of personal responsibility also expresses itself in performing magic rituals 
in order to expel uncontrollable forces. ‘Some fishermen would never begin a season on a 
Thursday, others keep pictures of religious deities in the wheel-house, some believe it is bad 
luck to change the name of a boat’ (Brooks, 2005: 806). Gouldner found miners endowed the 
so-called ‘prop man’ with magic properties. His purpose was to support the mineshafts. ‘The 
miners wove a network of folklore about their prop man’s personal prowess’. […] ‘The min-
ers expected that the prop man should be powerfully built and obviously muscular, for in a 
sense, they conceived of him as an Atlas who held up the roof’. […] ‘The prop, of course, did 
not only safeguard the miner’s safety, but also served the important psychological function of 
enhancing the miner’s feeling of control over his situation and his sense of security’ 
(Gouldner, 1954: 120-123). The effectiveness of magic rituals is ascribed, with hindsight, to 
the quality with which they were performed (Malinowski, 1925 [1948]: 86). Therefore, an 
accident does not necessarily prove the rituals at fault, but can also signify they were not car-
ried out properly. This means magic also implies personal responsibility. 
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 We can conclude that ethnographic safety studies indeed show an approach towards safety 
that fundamentally differs from formal, bureaucratic safety management, which is featured so 
prominently in safety surveys. Not the importance of mechanically following rules and proce-
dures is considered essential, but the possibility to apply general rules to one’s discretion on 
concrete situations. Safety training and education are considered of lesser importance than 
acquiring practical experiences. Teaching novices on-the-job is not only accompanied by the 
development of ‘sensory maps’ for dangers, but also by the acquirement of their identity as 
full-fledged employees. During this process of socialisation experienced workers try to pre-
vent novices from making mistakes by enabling them to experience dangers first hand instead 
of by imposing formal sanctions. Safety is conceived as a personal responsibility instead of an 
organisational one due to the pivotal role bestowed upon craftsmanship. 
In short, in ethnographic studies craftsmanship plays a central role instead of bureau-
cratic safety management. This craftsmanship consists of manual labour that cannot be fully 
standardised. The craftsman, then, also needs discretion to deliver a customised product. The 
knowledge and skills needed to deliver customised products is transferred to novices by ena-
bling them to experience what can go wrong during the execution of tasks. The craftsman’s 
notion that he plays a pivotal role in the execution of tasks is accompanied by a deep sense of 
responsibility for the product he delivers. 
 
 
Data and measurement 
 
This section deals with the answer to the question whether we achieved to measure craftsman-
ship in survey research. We also address the collection of the data and the measurement of the 
other concepts. 
 
Data 
Data were collected with a survey conducted in a Dutch energy company. Respondents con-
sisted of gas, heat, and electricity maintenance personnel and their managers. The surveys 
were mailed to the respondents accompanied with a letter clarifying the goal of the survey. 
All questions were multiple choice. The research population consisted of 856 persons. The 
response rate was 31 percent (N=265). 
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Measurement 
Our dependent variable self-reported involvement in incidents and accidents was measured by 
asking respondents how often they got involved in each of the following mishaps at work in 
the last two years: 1) near accidents, 2) accidents not resulting in absenteeism, 3) accidents 
resulting in absenteeism. The response categories ranged from: 1) never to 4) more than 
twice. These three items together constituted a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.67). 
The intermediate variable unsafe behaviour was measured with eight items covering the 
whole execution of a task, ranging from its preparation, execution, and checking to the sanc-
tioning of deviations.2 The eight items produced a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.74). 
The first of three independent variables: perceived presence of bureaucratic safety man-
agement was measured with nine items,3 covering the following three dimensions: 1) rules 
and regulations, 2) training and education, 3) sanctioning and supervision. The scales reliabil-
ity of these nine items was good (Cronbach’s α = 0.81). 
The measurement of the second independent variable craftsmanship merits a close look 
because it is a new concept for safety surveys. We measured seventeen items covering the 
three dimensions discussed in the theoretical section: 1) discretion in handling safety matters, 
2) tacit knowledge in handling safety matters, 3) personal responsibility with respect to inci-
dents and accidents. 
Table 1 shows that the unrotated Principal Component Analysis yielded five factors 
with an Eigenvalue exceeding one. The scree plot (not depicted) showed a distinct break be-
tween the steep slope of the first three largest factors and the trailing of the last two. The la-
tent factors underlying these first three factors refer to, respectively: 1) discretion, 2) personal 
responsibility and 3) tacit knowledge. This means that our measurement of craftsmanship 
consists of three separate factors instead of a single one. However, these three dimensions 
correspond perfectly with the concept of craftsmanship discussed in the theoretical section. 
 
2. The answer categories consisted of a scale ranging from: 1) never to 5) very often. With the loading on the 
first factor in brackets, the eight items were: 1) Being unprepared while fixing a malfunction (0.62), 2) Deviating 
from safety procedures (0.77), 3) Performing a task individually, which should have been executed by two or 
more workers (0.75), 4) Working without mandatory personal protection clothing (0.69), 5) Working in a man-
ner which endangers you or a colleague (0.67), 6) Leaving a workplace in such a manner, that it causes danger 
for others (0.49), 8) How often have you received a note in your employee personnel file or were you given a 
negative assessment (0.36). 
3. All the answer categories consist of a scale ranging from (1) very less to (5) very much. 1) Safety procedures 
(0.61), 2) Adapting procedures on account of changing circumstances or new legislation (0.68), 3) Testing em-
ployees’ knowledge pertaining to safety procedures (0.69), 4) Demonstrating safety procedures on-the-job 
(0.51), 5) Brushing up employees’ knowledge by means of safety training and safety courses (0.64), 6) Issuing 
safety instructions to new employees before they start working (0.71), 7) Safety inspections (0.53), 8) Discussing 
working safely during assessments (0.61), 9) Discussing safety during work meetings (0.67), 10) Providing 
feedback on incident reports (0.51). 
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Table 1. Perceived presence of craftsmanship (N=236; factor loadings below 0.30 are left out). 
 Unrotated PCA Varimax rotated 
analysis of first 3 PC 
3  1 2 3 4 5 1 2 
Tacit knowledge 
Using experienced workers to train novices on-the-job 
Keeping an extra eye on novices 
Making novices aware of danger by testing them during specific activities 
Involving employees in the development of new safety procedures 
Involving employees in the purchase of new safety protection equipment 
Involving employees in the introduction of new equipment and techniques 
Duplicating risky situations so employees can experience what can go wrong 
Utilizing situations where employees found risks to their cost, to make them work more consciously 
Stringently correcting employees who work unsafe 
 
Discretion 
Adapting safety procedures when employees say they are hindered by them during work 
Allowing employees to use their discretion, even when this means violating rules and procedures 
Allowing employees to use their discretion in situations that have not been foreseen by rules 
Trusting that workers themselves know best how to carry out a task 
 
Personal responsibility 
During each task I am aware that something can go wrong 
The slightest laps in concentration can lead to an accident 
I am always aware that even the slightest mistake can result in an accident 
When an incident occurs, I automatically wonder whether I could have prevented it 
 
0.60 
0.59 
0.63 
0.66 
0.70 
0.65 
0.77 
0.63 
0.50 
 
 
0.61 
 
0.37 
0.39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.84 
0.82 
0.82 
0.41 
 
 
-0.33 
-0.44 
-0.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.30 
0.67 
0.61 
0.64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.52 
0.40 
 
-0.31 
-0.52 
 
 
0.31 
 
 
 
 
0.37 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.37 
-0.43 
 
 
0.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.67 
0.76 
0.77 
0.70 
0.63 
0.74 
0.56 
0.49 
0.47 
 
 
0.44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.85 
0.85 
0.86 
0.46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.50 
0.68 
0.70 
0.74 
Eigenvalue 
Explained variance (%) 
Cronbach’s α 
4.5 
27  
2.4 
14 
 
1.8 
11 
 
1.3 
7 
 
1.1 
6 
 
4,1 
 25 
0.84 
2.3 
14 
0.77 
2.2 
14 
0.67 
 
 
 
Next, table 1 shows the results of the varimax rotated Principal Component Analysis based 
on the first three factors only. It shows that just the item ‘Adapting safety procedures when 
employees say they are hindered by them during work loads stronger than 0.30 on two fac-
tors: 0.44 on the tacit knowledge factor and 0.50 on the discretion factor. Therefore, it was 
possible to use each item for the measurement of one craftsmanship dimension only. Be-
cause of our relatively small sample, we wanted to minimize the total amount of cases that 
had to be excluded from our analyses because of missing values. For this reason we did not 
save factor scores of each scale, but computed the average score on a minimum of valid an-
swers to the items belonging to each of the three scales. We allowed missing values on two 
items belonging to the tacit knowledge factor and one missing value on the items belonging 
to the personal responsibility and discretion scales. The measurement of each factor yielded 
a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α perceived utilisation of tacit knowledge in handling safety 
matters = 0.84; Cronbach’s α perceived personal responsibility for incidents and accidents = 
0.67; Cronbach’s α perceived utilisation of discretion in handling safety matters = 0.76). 
 
For our last research question, we had to make a distinction between employees who legiti-
mise a particular safety management technique and those who do not. 
Therefore, we did not only ask respondents for the perceived presence of bureau-
cratic safety management and of the utilisation of tacit knowledge and discretion in handling 
safety matters, but also whether they legitimised each of the safety management techniques.4 
Each analysis produced a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α desirability of bureaucratic safety 
management = 0.86; Cronbach’s α desirability of tacit knowledge= 0.83; Cronbach’s α de-
sirability of discretion= 0.75). Further, we recoded these three variables to dichotomous 
variables with the categories: 1) desired safety management technique, 2) undesired safety 
management technique. Because it was senseless to measure the legitimisation of the attribu-
tion of personal responsibility – either you do or you do not – we did not. 
 
 
Results  
 
In this section we discuss the results of the quantitative analyses. We will successively assert 
to which extent the effects of formal safety management on safety performances depend on 
                                                 
4. All the answer categories consist of a scale ranging from: 1) very undesirable to 5) very desirable. 
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informal coping strategies, whether informal coping strategies influence safety performances 
apart from formal safety management and to which extent the effects of both formal and in-
formal safety management depend on their legitimacy.  
 Figure 1 shows that employees report themselves more often as former victims of 
incidents and accidents as they account for more unsafe behaviour (ß = 0.21; p < 0.05). 
Moreover, they report less unsafe behaviour as they perceive more bureaucratic safety man-
agement. This means the perceived presence of bureaucratic safety management improves 
safety performances. The perceived presence of safety rules and their enforcement and of 
safety education and training withholds employees from unsafe behaviour. 
 
 
Figure 1. Self-reported incidents and accidents and unsafe behaviour explained 
(N=216; R2 unsafe behaviour = 16%, R2 self-reported incidents and accidents = 9%; all 
paths shown are significant (p < 0.05)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perceived presence 
of formal safety 
management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, the results show the effect of formal policy on safety performances depends on 
informal coping strategies. When controlled for the three dimensions of craftsmanship, the 
Perceived utilisation 
of tacit knowledge 
Perceived utilisation 
of discretion 
-0.19 
Incidents and 
accidents 
Unsafe 
behaviour 
-0.26 0.21 
0.14 
Personal responsi-
bility 
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correlation of –0.32 (not depicted in figure 1) between perceived presence of bureaucratic 
safety management and self-reported incidents and accidents decreases to a beta of –0.19. 
This means 41 percent of the effect of the perceived presence of formal safety management 
on safety performances must really be ascribed to informal coping strategies (0.32 - 0.19 / 
0,32 = 41 percent). Put in other words, the three dimensions of craftsmanship facilitate the 
effectiveness of formal safety management. 
The results also show informal coping strategies have an influence on safety per-
formances apart from formal safety management. Employees report less unsafe behaviour as 
they perceive more utilisation of tacit knowledge in handling risks (ß = -0.26; p < 0.05). On 
the other hand, the perception of discretion in handling risks results in more unsafe behav-
iour (ß = 0.14; p < 0.05). The extent to which employees find themselves responsible for ac-
cidents turned out not to affect safety performances. In retrospect, this is logic. The extent to 
which employees find themselves responsible for accidents is an attitude that conveys re-
sponsibility for accidents after they occur. It makes sense, therefore, that this does not affect 
acts preceding accidents. Because the attribution of personal responsibility for accidents did 
not affect safety performances, we excluded it from our next analysis. 
None of the perceived safety management types has a direct effect on safety achieve-
ments; all effects are indirectly caused by their effects on unsafe behaviour. In total 9 percent 
of the total variance in self reported incidents and accidents can be explained by the different 
types of safety management. 
 
Figure 2 shows the influence of formal safety management on safety performances does not 
depend on its legitimacy. The influence of the perceived presence of formal safety manage-
ment on safety performances did not differ significantly between those who do not legitimise 
it and those who do (ß = -0.30 versus ß = -0.33). However, the influence of informal coping 
strategies do depend on their legitimisation. The perceived utilisation of tacit knowledge in 
handling risks reduces unsafe behaviour to the greatest extent for those who believe in doing 
so (ß = -0.18 versus ß = -0.34), while the importance of legitimacy is most obvious with re-
spect to the perceived utilisation of discretion in handling risks; employees who regard it 
suitable report less unsafe behaviour as they perceive more discretion, while the inverse is 
true for those who believe discretion is unsuited for handling risks (ß = 0.21 versus ß = -
0.28). In short, the perceived utilisation of tacit knowledge prevents unsafe behaviour most 
among those who legitimise it, while the effect of the perceived utilisation of discretion is 
positive for those who legitimise it and negative for those who do not. 
 14
 15
We suspect the different impact of legitimisation on the effects of both formal and in-
formal safety management results from recent developments within the company we re-
searched. In recent years, the safety policy of this company has been bureaucratised largely. 
The company has invested mostly in safety regulations, personal protective devices, safety 
courses and trainings, and inspections and enforcement. This process seems to have eroded 
the normality of craftsmanship. Newcomers get responsibilities based on their credentials 
instead of practical experiences enabled by expert colleagues. Safety inspections have been 
disconnected from the execution of daily tasks and the emphasis has shifted from personal 
responsibility for safety to organisational responsibility. In other words, the bureaucratisa-
tion of safety policy seems to have forced the importance of craftsmanship into the back-
ground. Therefore, it is understandable it still works for those who still believe in it, while it 
does hardly any more for those who have lost faith in it. Since the bureaucratisation of for-
mal policy has lead to it becoming the standard, it makes sense its effectiveness does not de-
pend on its legitimisation.
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Figure 2. Unsafe behaviour explained respectively for those who do not legitimise a particular safety management technique and for 
those who do (N bureaucratic illegitimate = 125, N bureaucratic legitimate = 121; N tacit knowledge illegitimate = 107, N tacit knowledge 
legitimate = 141; N discretion illegitimate = 117, N discretion legitimate = 135) 
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Conclusion and discussion 
 
First, we have established the effect of formal, bureaucratic safety management on safety 
performances (i.e. self-reported incidents and accidents) depends on informal coping 
strategies. Part of the attribution of the perceived presence of formal safety management 
must really be ascribed to informal coping strategies. This means, in other words, that in-
formal coping strategies facilitate the effectiveness of formal safety management. More-
over, we have demonstrated that informal coping strategies also have an effect on safety 
performances independent of formal safety management. The perceived utilisation of tacit 
knowledge improves safety performances because they reduce unsafe behaviour, while 
perceived presence of professional discretion worsens it because it enhances unsafe behav-
iour. Therefore, we can conclude the focus of safety surveys on the effects of formal safety 
management on safety performances is problematic. For it means that both the direct and 
indirect effects of informal coping strategies on safety performances remain unnoticed. 
We have also established that the influence of formal safety management on safety 
performances does not depend on its legitimacy while the influence of informal coping 
strategies do. The perceived utilisation of tacit knowledge prevents unsafe behaviour most 
among those who legitimise it, while the effect of the perceived utilisation of discretion is 
positive for those who legitimise it and negative for those who do not. We suspect the dif-
ferent impact of legitimisation on the both types of safety management results from recent 
developments within the company of our research. In recent years, the safety policy of this 
company has been bureaucratised largely. The company has invested mostly in safety 
regulations, personal protective devices, safety courses and trainings, and inspections and 
enforcement. This process seems to have eroded the normality of craftsmanship that un-
derlies informal coping strategies with safety. Therefore, it is understandable it still works 
for those who still believe in it, while it does hardly any more for those who have lost faith 
in it. Whether this is indeed the reason legitimacy has a greater impact on the effects of 
informal coping strategies than on that of formal safety management and whether these 
developments might also occur in other companies, we think deserves more systematic 
research. 
A second question our research raises, is how it can be understood that the ethno-
graphic research tradition has consequently been ignored by safety surveys. We can think 
of at least two possible reasons. First, it can be an unintended consequence of the quest for 
accumulation of knowledge. In this type of research validated measurement instruments 
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and replication research are frequently used, and answers to known research problems are 
often sought. This falling back on previous research contains the risk of not only replicat-
ing valuable research insights but also blind spots. This means that the quest for scientific 
validity by safety climate researchers would unintentionally cloud scientific vision. Sec-
ondly, the measurability of both approaches towards safety could play a role. It is easier to 
measure the presence of formal policy than the extent to which this policy is actually fea-
sible. Questions regarding the perceived presence of formal safety management, however, 
do not take into account the informal coping strategies with safety that are the main focus 
of ethnographic studies. Thus, there are good reasons to tear down the boundaries between 
both research traditions. 
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